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Abstract
Social interactions in classic cognitive games like the ultimatum game or the prisoner’s dilemma typically lead to Nash
equilibria when multiple competitive decision makers with perfect knowledge select optimal strategies. However, in
evolutionary game theory it has been shown that Nash equilibria can also arise as attractors in dynamical systems that can
describe, for example, the population dynamics of microorganisms. Similar to such evolutionary dynamics, we find that
Nash equilibria arise naturally in motor interactions in which players vie for control and try to minimize effort. When
confronted with sensorimotor interaction tasks that correspond to the classical prisoner’s dilemma and the rope-pulling
game, two-player motor interactions led predominantly to Nash solutions. In contrast, when a single player took both roles,
playing the sensorimotor game bimanually, cooperative solutions were found. Our methodology opens up a new avenue
for the study of human motor interactions within a game theoretic framework, suggesting that the coupling of motor
systems can lead to game theoretic solutions.
Citation: Braun DA, Ortega PA, Wolpert DM (2009) Nash Equilibria in Multi-Agent Motor Interactions. PLoS Comput Biol 5(8): e1000468. doi:10.1371/
journal.pcbi.1000468
Editor: Karl J. Friston, University College London, United Kingdom
Received March 27, 2009; Accepted July 14, 2009; Published August 14, 2009
Copyright:  2009 Braun et al. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
Funding: This study was supported in parts by the Bo ¨hringer-Ingelheim-Fonds (BIF), the Wellcome Trust and the European grant SENSOPAC IST-2005-028056.
The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.
Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.
* E-mail: dab54@cam.ac.uk
Introduction
Riding a tandem, tango dancing, arm wrestling and judo are
diverse but familiar examples of two-player motor interactions.
The characteristic feature of such interactions is that the two
players influence each others behavior through coupled sensori-
motor control with continuous action spaces over repeated trials or
continuously in time. In contrast, two-player interactions consid-
ered in classical game theory are typically thought to involve
cognition in games with discrete actions and discrete time steps for
decision-making such as tic-tac-toe, the ultimatum game or the
prisoner’s dilemma [1–8]. An important concept in such classical
games is the Nash equilibrium solution [9] in which each player
chooses a strategy such that no player has anything to gain by
changing only his or her strategy. Nash equilibria can also be
defined for continuous games, i.e. games with continuous actions
and payoffs [10–12], and thus might provide a theoretical tool to
understand multi-agent sensorimotor interactions. The theory of
continuous games can also be used for sequential (dynamic) games
where players are interacting continuously over a sequence of time
steps [13–15]. Nash equilibria in such continuous dynamic motor
games correspond to (equilibrium) control policies, i.e. feedback
rules that map past observations to actions.
Here, we develop continuous sensorimotor versions of the
prisoner’s dilemma and the rope-pulling game. In the classical
prisoner’s dilemma [16], two players (prisoners) have a choice
(Fig. 1A) between cooperation (claiming the other player is
innocent) and defection (claiming the other player is guilty). If both
cooperate, they each receive a short sentence (3 years) whereas if
both defect they each receive a moderate sentence (7 years). But if
one cooperates while the other defects, the defector is freed and
the cooperator receives a lengthy sentence (10 years). The globally
optimal solution in which the players benefit the most is for both
players to cooperate. However, if one of the players decides to
defect, the defector reduces their sentence at the expense of the
other player. In such a non-cooperative setting the stable Nash
solution is for both players to defect. This Nash solution
guarantees in this case that a player minimizes their maximum
expected punishment (in this case 7 years) and the player does not
have to rely on a particular action being chosen by the other
player. The dilemma arises because the Nash solution is not
identical to the globally optimal solution which is cooperative. The
same dilemma occurs also in the rope-pulling game (given as a
conceptual example in [15]) where each of two players is attached
by a rope to a mass that they have to pull together. One player is
rewarded according to how far he pulls the mass along one
direction and the other player is reward according to how far he
pulls the mass in an orthogonal direction. Thus, the globally
optimal solution is to cooperate and pull the mass along the
diagonal. However, if one of the players defects and pulls into his
own direction he gains even more payoff at the expense of the
other player. Therefore, the stable Nash solution in this case is for
each player to pull along his own direction. In the following we
address the question whether human motor interactions in such
motor games can be quantified using a game theoretic framework.
Results
In our continuous sensorimotor version of prisoner’s dilemma
(see Materials and Methods), two players sat next to each other and
grasped the handles of separate robotic interfaces that were free to
move in the horizontal plane (Fig. 1B, orange players). A virtual
reality system was used to overlay visual feedback onto the plane of
movement and players were prevented from seeing their own hand
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ofa cursorthat represented the positionoftheir hand.On eachtrial,
the players were required to move their cursors to touch target bars
which were directly ahead of them. However, participants were free
to move the handle laterally to touch the target bar anywhere along
its width. Therefore, participants could achieve the task with their
final hand position anywhere between the left and right target
bounds. One bound (e.g. left) represented cooperation while the
other bound (e.g. right) represented defection. An implicit pay-off
was placed on the movements by using each robot to generate a
resistive force opposing the forward motion of the handle. The
forces were generatedbysimulating springsthat acted between each
handle and its starting bar. The stiffness of each spring could vary
continuously during the movement depending on the lateral
positions of both handles. Directly analogous to the prisoner’s
dilemma, the spring constants depended on whether the two players
cooperated or defected. That is we translate the sentence in years in
the traditional cognitive game (Fig. 1A) into spring constants in N/
m in our sensorimotor game. For positions of the handles between
the bounds, that is between full cooperation and full defection, we
linearly interpolated these spring constants (Fig. 1C shows spring
constants landscape for each player). Therefore, the actions of each
player directly affected both the forces they experienced, as well as
the forces experienced by the other player. The game was either
played by two players (Fig. 1B, orange) or by one player bimanually
(Fig.1B,green).Wehypothesized thatthe bimanualconditioncould
be conceived of as two cooperating players (instantiated by the two
brain hemispheres) which should result in cooperative solutions as
opposed to the competitive Nash solutions expected for the two-
player setup. Each session consisted of 20 sets with each set
consisting of 40 trials. At the start of each set the assignment of the
defect/cooperation boundaries to the left/right side of each target
was randomized.
Thus, our motor version of the prisoner’s dilemma differs from
the classic discrete version of the game in at least three different
aspects. First, actions are continuous such that there is a
continuous coupling between the two players. Second, reward in
terms of money or years is replaced by an implicit cost, that is
effort. Third, subjects have to learn their optimal strategy since
they are unaware of the structure of the coupling, i.e. they have
incomplete information about the payoffs. We found a clear
distinction between the strategies used at the end of a set for the
one-player and the two-player conditions. In Figure 2A and
Figure 3A we show the endpoint distributions of the action choices
for the two-player and the bimanual conditions. To analyze this
result we categorized the final positions of the cursors in Figure 2B
and Figure 3B into defect and cooperate responses, that is Nash
responses (defect-defect), cooperative responses (cooperate-coop-
erate) and exploitative responses (defect-cooperate or cooperate-
defect). In the one-player condition, the globally optimal
cooperative solution was chosen in the majority of instances
(Fig. 3B). In contrast, although in some of the two-player games
there was a small fraction of exploitative trials, the two-player
game led mostly to the Nash solution (Fig. 2B). The globally
optimal cooperative solution was seen significantly more often for
the one-player game compared to the two-player game (p,0.01,
Figure 1. The prisoner’s dilemma motor game. (A) Pay-off matrix for the classical prisoner’s dilemma for two players (players denoted by red
and blue). Depending on the choice of each player there are four different outcomes in terms of years that each player will serve in prison. (B) The
motor version of the prisoner’s dilemma. Each player controls a cursor and moves from a starting bar to a target bar and experiences a force that
resists forward motion. The force arises from a virtual spring that attaches the handle to the starting bar (the springs are only shown on the schematic
and are not visible to the players). The stiffness of the springs (K1 &K 2) can vary online and each depends on the x-positions of both players’ cursors
(x1 &x 2). (C) Continuous cost landscape for the motor prisoner’s dilemma game. Each pair of x-positions (x1,x 2) corresponds to a spring constant for
each player. The corners of the plane correspond to the classical prisoner’s dilemma matrix (A) and intermediate spring constants are obtained by
linear interpolation. The current spring constants experienced by the players in B are shown by the points on the surface. The game was played by
eight pairs of players and by eight individual players bimanually.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000468.g001
Author Summary
Human motor interactions range from adversarial activities
like judo and arm wrestling to more cooperative activities
like tandem riding and tango dancing. In this study, we
design a new methodology to study human sensorimotor
interactions quantitatively based on game theory. We
develop two motor tasks based on the prisoner’s dilemma
and the rope-pulling game in which we introduce an
intrinsic cost related to effort rather than the typical
monetary outcome used in cognitive game theory. We find
that continuous motor interactions converged to game
theoretic outcomes similar to the interaction dynamics
reported for other dynamical systems in biology ranging in
scale from microorganisms to population dynamics.
Nash Equilibria in Motor Control
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two-player versus the bimanual condition) and conversely the
Nash solution was seen significantly more often (p,0.01) for the
two-player game than for the one-player game.
To investigate the temporal evolution of learning we analyzed
the trial-by-trial behavior of the players averaged across all sets.
Initially, in both the one-player and the two-player conditions,
players acted at chance level in their strategy (Fig. 4). Later trials of
the one-player game converged to the globally optimal cooperative
solution, while their probability of choosing a Nash solution
dropped to close to zero (Fig. 4A). In contrast, players in the two-
player condition showed an increasing tendency to act according
to the Nash solution over the course of a set, while their probability
of choosing a cooperative solution dropped significantly below
chance level (Fig. 4B). The frequency of the exploitative solutions
decreased in the bimanual condition along with the frequency of
the Nash solution (Fig. 4C). In the two-player game on the other
hand, the frequency of exploitative solutions stayed around chance
level (Fig. 4D). Therefore, players in both conditions showed
significant exploration and learning over trials.
In our sensorimotor version of the prisoner’s dilemma the
cooperative and Nash solutions are two extremes of the one-
dimensional control variable (lateral position at the target bar).
Therefore, we designed a motor task based on another game, the
‘rope-pulling-game’, which has three additional features. First, the
control variable is two-dimensional and the Nash and cooperative
solutions are no longer at the boundaries of the control space.
Second, unlike the prisoner’s dilemma, where each player can
achieve their task (reaching the bar) without paying attention to
the strategy of the other player, in the new task, coordination is
required between the players to jointly achieve the task. Third, the
rope-pulling game can be translated into a linear dynamical
system allowing for analytical solutions in terms of feedback
policies (see Text S1 for details). In the rope-pulling-game, two
players each pull on a rope attached to a mass (Fig. 5A). Player 1
and player 2 are rewarded according to how far each manages to
pull the mass along the y- and x-axis respectively. If the players
cooperate they should both pull along the diagonal (Fig. 5A, right),
because in this way no forces are wasted compensating for the
other player’s force. However, if one of the players decides to
Figure 2. Results of the two-player version of the prisoner’s dilemma. (A) Endpoint distribution of handle positions in the four quadrants
corresponding to the cooperate defect (lateral movement) plane with the cooperative solution (top left quadrant), the Nash solution (bottom right
quadrant) and the two exploitative solutions (top right or bottom left quadrant). Each plot shows one of the eight games in the two-player version of
the prisoner’s dilemma. The data is shown for the last 20 trials in each set. (B) Histogram over the four quadrants. C corresponds to cooperation and D
to defection. All eight participant-pairs show a strong tendency towards the Nash solution.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000468.g002
Nash Equilibria in Motor Control
PLoS Computational Biology | www.ploscompbiol.org 3 August 2009 | Volume 5 | Issue 8 | e1000468defect and pull only in his own direction while the other pulls
along the diagonal, the defector increases his reward at the
expense of the other player. In such a non-cooperative setting the
stable Nash solution is for each player to pull only in his own
direction (Fig. 5A, left).
In our version of the rope-pulling game, player 1 and 2’s task
was to move a virtual mass to a fixed target that was equidistant to
both players’ origin. Again, each participant grasped the handle of
the robotic interface and the location of the virtual mass was the
sum of the (possibly rotated—see Materials and Methods)
positional displacements of the two handles from their origin
(Fig. 5B, red and blue arrow vectors) – just like the positional
vectors of two real agents would add up when pulling a real mass.
Accordingly, there are infinitely many solutions to reach the target
as there are infinitely many ways of how to add two vectors to
become a certain target vector. However, each player only saw a
one-dimensional projection of the two-dimensional position of the
virtual mass, i.e. one player saw a projection along the virtual x-
axis and the other player saw a projection along the virtual y-axis
corresponding to the direction that they had to control (Fig. 5B).
An implicit pay-off was placed on the movements by using the
robots to simulate stiff springs between each handle and its origin.
Therefore, the further a player had to move the robotic handle
from the origin to achieve the task, the greater the resistive force
and hence effort required. Limiting each participant’s visual
feedback to one-dimension, while preventing them from seeing the
other participant’s feedback, ensures that they could not form an
explicit representation that could be used for cognitive solutions.
In contrast to the prisoner’s dilemma task the actions of each
player did not directly affect the forces experienced by the other
player but directly affected the position of the other player’s
cursor. Therefore, each cursor was affected by both players
requiring coordination between the players to achieve the task,
because subjects could not disregard the other player’s action
choice as both actions had to add up to a fixed target value. The
game was either played by two players (Fig. 5B, orange) or by one
player bimanually (Fig. 5B, green) as in the previous game.
We analyzed the distribution of pulling directions after learning
(Fig. 5C, positions & 5D angles). We found that when a single
participant played the game bimanually the movements tended to
Figure 3. Results of the one-player bimanual version of the prisoner’s dilemma. (A) Endpoint distribution of handle positions in the four
quadrants corresponding to the cooperate defect (lateral movement) plane with the cooperative solution (top left quadrant), the Nash solution
(bottom right quadrant) and the two exploitative solutions (top right or bottom left quadrant). Each plot shows one of the eight participants. The
data is shown for the last 20 trials in each set. (B) Histogram over the four quadrants. C corresponds to cooperation and D to defection. All eight
participants had a strong preference for the cooperative solution.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000468.g003
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clustered around 45u for both arms. In contrast, in the two-player
game the directions tended to converge to the Nash solution with
pulling directions around 0u and 90u for the two participants. In
individual games, both single players and pairs of players could
deviate substantially from their respective solutions. Importantly,
however, the densities of the solutions in the one-player and two-
player conditions were different. Examining the average solution
for each participant in the two player game and for each arm in
the one-player game showed that the two-player game deviated
significantly from 45u (p,0.01, Wilcoxon signrank test), while the
one-player game did not (p.0.1). Thus, individual players tended
towards a cooperative solution between the two arms, whereas two
players tended towards a Nash equilibrium on average.
Discussion
In our study we have assessed human sensorimotor interactions
based on game theoretic predictions with an implicit cost, that is
effort. Effort, as a proxy for energy consumption, has been shown
to be a fundamental determinant underlying how humans control
their own movements [18,19]. In line with the game theoretic
predictions, we found in both motor games that the Nash
equilibrium was the predominant solution in two-player motor
interactions and the cooperative solution dominated in the one-
player interactions. Previous studies have shown that natural
patterns of coordination can arise between participants when
provided with feedback of the other participant, such as the
synchronization of gait patterns (for a review see [20]). In
distinction, in our study we limited knowledge of the other
participants’ behavior to a pay-off in terms of energy and showed
that different patterns of interaction develop in the one-player and
two-player conditions that can be explained within the game
theoretic framework. While this is a different explanatory
framework, one should bear in mind that optimality theories
and dynamic systems theory are in principle compatible with each
other [21]. In previous studies in psychology, human group
behavior in physical tasks such as tug-of-war has been examined
and compared to individual performance. It was found that
individuals tend to reduce their effort in group tasks and instead
rely on others, for example in force production in tug-of-war
[22,23]. This has been dubbed ‘‘social loafing’’, but has not been
examined in a game theoretic context. Yet, game theoretic analysis
has been applied to a wide range of biological systems from
interacting microorganisms [24,25], through animal behavior
[26,27] to understanding population dynamics [28].
Our results contrast with those obtained in cognitive discrete
games in interesting ways. For example, in the classical prisoner’s
dilemma, contrary to game-theoretic predictions, cooperation
plays a significant role: players have been reported to cooperate
almost half the time [29,2]. Consequently, a large number of
studies have investigated experimental and theoretical conditions
that allow for such cooperation [30–34]. Especially, in iterated
versions of the prisoner’s dilemma it was found that cooperative
strategies such as tit-for-tat or ‘‘win-stay lose-shift’’ can be very
successful [35–37]. While cooperation can be optimal in case of
indefinite repetitions [38], for a fixed number of iterations it is still
optimal to defect.
In our motor version of the prisoner’s dilemma the participants
showed very little inclination towards cooperative solutions. This
could have several reasons. Our participants knew, for example,
that the experiment was going to last for 800 trials, i.e. assuming
the participants had full knowledge of the game structure their
defection is optimal – however, knowing the number of trials does
not stop players in discrete cognitive games from cooperating. In
our study the action space is continuous. A recent theoretical study
has found, for example, that cooperative solutions are less stable in
continuous environments where agents can make gradual
distinctions of cooperativeness ranging from full cooperation to
total defection [13]. The intuition behind this finding is that the
deadlock of a non-cooperative equilibrium is more difficult to
break by agents that cooperate only slightly more than their non-
cooperative counterparts, because two marginally cooperating
agents have much less to gain from each others cooperation than
two tit-for-tat agents, for example, that try full cooperation. To
investigate the impact of action continuity on human coopera-
tiveness in games one could compare the outcomes of continuous
prisoner’s dilemma experiments with monetary feedback to the
outcomes of discrete versions of the game. Another important
difference of both our motor games compared to classic game
theoretic settings is that players had incomplete information about
the payoff function and the structure of the game. Thus, players
first had to gather information and learn the structural
determinants of the game. Again one could compare our results
to the outcome of classical prisoner’s dilemma games where
participants are not informed about payoff functions. Further-
more, due to the motor nature of the interactions, psychological
effects such as ‘mentalizing’ might have been reduced [39].
Participants in our motor games were not aware of the effects of
their actions on the other player, since each player could not feel
the force feedback given to the other player. To test whether such
psychological effects would have an influence in our games that
could lead towards more cooperation, one could give explicit
feedback about the other player’s payoff (e.g. force display in
Newtons) and explain that their choice of action affects the other
player’s toil. Finally, it would also be interesting to investigate
 
 
Figure 4. Temporal evolution of game solutions. (A,B) The
evolution of the probability of cooperative (blue) and Nash (red)
solutions across a 40 trial set for the one-player and two-player
conditions. In the one-player condition the cooperative solution gains
most probability, where as in the two-player condition the Nash
solution is predominant. (C,D) The evolution of the probability of the
exploitative solutions across the same set of trials for the one-player
and two-player conditions. The shading is one standard error of the
mean across the participants. As there are four possible behaviors
chance level is shown at a probability of 0.25.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000468.g004
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of games where the Nash solution corresponds to a minimax-
solution – this is in general true for zero-sum games [40], and also
for the prisoner’s dilemma. For this solution type, a player
minimizes the maximum expected loss, thereby ignoring the
actions of the other player (both in the classical and the motor
prisoner’s dilemma game). Thus, more complex games with more
complex cost functions provide an interesting avenue for future
research.
In our second motor game, the rope-pulling game, over all
players we still observed that the Nash solution was the
predominant solution for two-player interactions, but this time
the inter-subject differences were quite considerable both in the
two-player condition and in the bimanual case. One reason for this
could be that the task was substantially more complex than the
prisoner’s dilemma task, especially in the bimanual case where two
two-dimensional movements had to be performed simultaneously.
Thus, incomplete learning might have played a crucial role. To
model such states of incomplete information a special theory of
Bayesian games has been devised dealing with so-called Bayes-
Nash solutions [41] that need not to correspond to Nash equilibria
in the same game under complete information. Furthermore, the
dynamics of learning in two-player interactions are also studied in
the reinforcement learning literature from a single-agent perspec-
tive [42–46]. Here we restricted ourselves to simpler classic game-
theoretic models to analyze two-player motor interactions
assuming complete information, i.e. complete learning of the true
payoff structure – the same assumption is typically made in other
optimal control models where learning itself is not modeled
[19,18]. Indeed, cooperation in our game can be modeled using
optimal feedback control theory [18] – in Text S1 we indicate how
normative and methodical principles from optimal feedback
control can be carried over to game theoretic settings. Although
dynamic game theory is the most general formulation of motor
games, it is not the only tool available to model sensorimotor
interactions. For some games, such as those considered in our
experiments, simple geometric considerations can be sufficient. In
our games players also had imperfect information about the
actions of the other player, i.e. they only felt the consequences of
the other player’s actions without feeling the force feedback given
to the other player. This does not invalidate our model, however,
since in our games players did not have to know the other players
Figure 5. The rope-pulling game. (A) The rope-pulling game in which a mass (circle) is pulled by two players. The arrows show the direction of
force for two players for the Nash and cooperative solutions. Red and blue colors represent right and left handles throughout. (B) The motor version
of the rope-pulling game. The position of a virtual mass is the sum of the displacements of the two handle positions from their origin (blue and red
displacement vectors). However, the visual feedback is only a one-dimensional cursor location that is the y and x values of the mass position for
players 1 and 2 respectively. Each player is required to reach a visual target with their cursor. Each robot was used to simulate the forces that would
arise from a spring (with constant stiffness) attached between the handle and its origin. The arrow vectors and springs are only shown on the
schematic and are not visible to the participants (grayed area not visible). For the one player game, a single participant controls both handles. The
game was played by 4 pairs of participants and by 4 different participants individually. (C) Mean end points for each pair of left and right players for
the last 40 trials in each set. The ellipses are centered at the average end points across all participants and indicate one standard error. (D) Smoothed
frequency histograms (Gaussian kernel sd 20u) of pulling angles for the two-player condition (left: Nash equilibrium shown by vertical lines) and for
the one player condition (right: cooperative solution shown by vertical line).
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000468.g005
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mentioned, Nash equilibria in our games corresponded to
minimax-solutions. This is ultimately a consequence of the
structure of the cost functions we employed, since each players
payoff function did not take the actions of the other player into
account explicitly. In the future it will be interesting, therefore, to
investigate human motor interactions in games with more complex
cost functions and to apply more advanced modelling tools.
In both our motor games we compared performance of two-
players with the performance of a single player. The underlying
hypothesis was that the single player condition could be regarded
as an instance of a cooperative game where the two motor
hemispheres interact to achieve the task. If the two hemispheres
were unable to cooperate, for example as might be expected in
patients who have undergone commisurectomy [47], then Nash
equilibria might also arise in a single player. In summary, our
results suggest that sensorimotor interactions can be understood
by a game theoretic framework and that cooperative and Nash
solutions in motor interactions can arise naturally by the
dynamical coupling of two interacting sensorimotor processes.
Moreover, the general design of our experiments provides a tool
to translate classical games into continuous motor games and
might provide a new avenue for studying human motor
interactions.
Materials and Methods
Forty-eight naı ¨ve participants provided written informed
consent and took part in one of two motor games. The
experiments were conducted using two planar robotic interfaces
(vBOTs). Participants held the handle of the vBOT that
constrained hand movements to the horizontal plane. The vBOT
allowed us to record the position of the handle and to generate
forces on the hand with a 1 kHz update rate. Using a projection
system we overlaid virtual visual feedback into the plane of the
movement [17].
Ethics statement. All experimental procedures were
approved by the Psychology Research Ethics Committee of the
University of Cambridge.
Prisoner’s dilemma motor game. Each of the robot
handles controlled the position of a cursor in one half of the
horizontal workspace (Fig. 1B). The cursor could be continuously
controlled within a single trial. Each participant’s task was to place
their cursor within their respective target bar. A trial started after
both participants had placed their cursor stationery within their
respective starting bar. Both target bars then appeared at a
distance randomly drawn each trial between 5 and 20 cm (the
same distance for both players on each trial). Participants were
required to make a forward movement (y-direction) to touch the
target bar. They were free to touch it anywhere along its 15 cm
width (the robot simulated walls which prevented participants
moving further laterally than the width of the bar). For successful
trial completion, the target bar had to be reached by both players
within 1500 ms. The final x-position was taken as their choice in
the game. During the movement, both players experienced a one-
dimensional spring attached to the starting bar. The spring
constants depended on the lateral positions x1 and x2 of both
players, where x corresponds to a normalized lateral deviation
ranging between 0 and 1. For each target bar, one edge was
defined as defect (e.g. x~0) and the other as cooperate (e.g. x~1).
The assignment of the defect/cooperation boundaries to the left/
right side of each target could be randomized. This gave four
possible assignments (i.e. defect to left or right of target bar 1 and
defect to left or right of target bar 2). Intermediate lateral
deviations took on values between 0 and 1. The final x-position
was categorized as cooperate or defect depending on whether
xw0:5 or xv0:5. The spring constants were continuously
updated as K1~a:½3(1{x1)z7x2  and K2~a:½7x1z3(1{x2) ,
for players 1 and 2 respectively. The scaling parameter a was
constant throughout the experiment at 0.19 N/cm. These spring
constants are linear interpolations of the classical prisoner’s
dilemma matrix (Fig. 1A), with intermediate lateral deviations
leading to intermediate spring constants (Fig. 1C). The





resisting their forward motion in which y1 and y2 are the y-
distances of player 1 and 2’s hands from the starting bar
respectively. Participants performed 20 sets of 40 trials. At the
start of each set the allocation of the target edges to defect/
cooperate was randomized. Thus, within a set of 40 trials the same
force landscape was applied.
Rope-pulling game. The position of each robot handle was
expressed as a two-dimensional vector position wherepr andpl are
the position of right and left robot handle, respectively. The two
robot handle positions together determined the position of a
virtual mass at pm~c:½DhprzDwpl  where Dh and Dw are 262
rotation matrices. The scaling parameter was set to c~2
throughout the experiments in order to confine arm movements
t oas m a l l e rw o r k s p a c es oa st oa v o i dc o l l i s i o no ft h er o b o t
handles. The rotation matrices were introduced to factor out any
preference of movement direction and to allow repetitions of the
game with different solutions. The rotations for each robot, h and
w, were drawn randomly from [2135u, 290u, 245u,0 u, +45u].
For successful trial completion, the virtual mass had to be placed
on the virtual target at (13,13) cm for 200 ms within a time limit of
1500 ms. Therefore, participants had to move in two dimensions
so as to place the one-dimensional cursor in the target.
Accordingly, there are infinitely many solutions to reach the
target as there are infinitely many ways of how to add the two
position vectors to equal the target vector. However, neither the
virtual mass point position nor the virtual target was displayed in
2-dimensional space. Participants could only see a one-
dimensional projection of the virtual mass point such that
player 1 saw the y-component of the position and player 2 saw
the x-component of the virtual mass point position. This
corresponded to the dimension that they had to control.
Additionally, an isotropic spring (5 N/cm) was simulated
attached from the handle of each robot to its origin. This
increased the effort required for larger movements. Each game
consisted of 10 sets of 80 trials with the same visuomotor rotations.
Visual feedback was provided continuously throughout the
movement. The final cursor position was taken as the players’
choice in the game and used to compute the pulling angles. The
feedback ensured that participants were never aware of playing a
version of the rope-pulling game.
Each game was played by eight pairs of participants and by
eight different participants individually. All participants were
instructed to achieve the task as easily as possible. Participants
were also told the number of trials in each set, and the sets were
separated during the experiment by short breaks. For the two-
player game a divider was used to prevent the participants seeing
the cursor or arm of the other player. In the single-player
condition subjects saw the same screen that would be displayed to
two players in the game condition.
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Nash Equilibria in Motor Control
PLoS Computational Biology | www.ploscompbiol.org 7 August 2009 | Volume 5 | Issue 8 | e1000468Acknowledgments
We thank Aldo Faisal, Ian Howard, James Ingram and Luc Selen for their
assistance.
Author Contributions
Conceived and designed the experiments: DAB PAO DMW. Performed
the experiments: DAB. Analyzed the data: DAB PAO DMW. Wrote the
paper: DAB DMW. Designed the figures: PAO.
References
1. Fudenberg D, Tirole J (1991) Game theory. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
2. Camerer C (2003) Behavioral game theory: experiments in strategic interaction.
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
3. Sanfey AG (2007) Social decision-making: insights from game theory and
neuroscience. Science 318: 598–602.
4. Jensen K, Call J, Tomasello M (2007) Chimpanzees are rational maximizers in
an ultimatum game. Science 318: 107–109.
5. Memmert D (2006) Self-controlled practice of decision-making skills. Percept
Mot Skills 103: 879–882.
6. King-Casas B, Tomlin D, Anen C, Camerer CF, Quartz SR, et al. (2005)
Getting to know you: reputation and trust in a two-person economic exchange.
Science 308: 78–83.
7. Lee D, McGreevy BP, Barraclough DJ (2005) Learning and decision making in
monkeys during a rock-paper-scissors game. Brain Res Cogn Brain Res 25:
416–430.
8. Shafir E, Tversky A (1992) Thinking through uncertainty: nonconsequential
reasoning and choice. Cognit Psychol 24: 449–474.
9. Nash JF (1950) Equilibrium Points in N-Person Games. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A
36: 48–49.
10. Glicksberg IL (1952) A Further Generalization of the Kakutani Fixed Point
Theorem, with Application to Nash Equilibrium Points. Proceedings of the
American Mathematical Society 3: 170–174.
11. Fan K (1952) Fixed-point and Minimax Theorems in Locally Convex
Topological Linear Spaces. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 38: 121–126.
12. Debreu G (1952) A Social Equilibrium Existence Theorem. Proc Natl Acad
Sci U S A 38: 886–893.
13. Le S, Boyd R (2007) Evolutionary dynamics of the continuous iterated prisoner’s
dilemma. J Theor Biol 245: 258–267.
14. Papavassilopoulos GP, Medanic JV, Cruz JB (1979) Existence of Nash strategies
and solutions to coupled Riccati equations in linear-quadratic games. J Optim
Theory Appl 28: 49–76.
15. Basar T, Olsder GJ (1999) Dynamic noncooperative game theory. Philadelphia,
Pa.: SIAM.
16. Poundstone W (1992) Prisoner’s dilemma. New York Doubleday.
17. Howard IS, Ingram JN, Wolpert DM (2009) A modular planar robotic
manipulandum with end-point torque control. Journal of Neuroscience Methods
181: 199–211.
18. Todorov E, Jordan MI (2002) Optimal feedback control as a theory of motor
coordination. Nature neuroscience 5: 1226–1235.
19. Diedrichsen J (2007) Optimal task-dependent changes of bimanual feedback
control and adaptation. Curr Biol 17: 1675–1679.
20. Kelso JAS (1995) Dynamic patterns : the self-organization of brain and behavior.
Cambridge, Mass.; London: MIT Press. xvii,334 p.
21. Schaal S, Mohajerian P, Ijspeert A (2007) Dynamics systems vs. optimal control–
a unifying view. Progress in brain research 165: 425–445.
22. Ringelmann M (1913) Recherches sur les moteurs anime ´s: Travail de l’homme.
Annales de l’Institut National Argonomique 12: 1–40.
23. Karau S, Williams KD (1993) Social Loafing: A Meta-Analytic Review and
Theoretical Integration. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 65:
681–706.
24. Reichenbach T, Mobilia M, Frey E (2007) Mobility promotes and jeopardizes
biodiversity in rock-paper-scissors games. Nature 448: 1046–1049.
25. Kerr B, Riley MA, Feldman MW, Bohannan BJ (2002) Local dispersal promotes
biodiversity in a real-life game of rock-paper-scissors. Nature 418: 171–174.
26. Bshary R, Grutter AS, Willener AS, Leimar O (2008) Pairs of cooperating
cleaner fish provide better service quality than singletons. Nature 455: 964–966.
27. Stephens DW, McLinn CM, Stevens JR (2002) Discounting and reciprocity in
an Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. Science 298: 2216–2218.
28. Smith JM (1982) Evolution and the theory of games. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
29. Colman AM (2003) Cooperation, psychological game theory, and limitations of
rationality in social interaction. The Behavioral and brain sciences 26: 139–153;
discussion 153–198.
30. Acevedo M, Krueger JI (2005) Evidential reasoning in the prisoner’s dilemma.
Am J Psychol 118: 431–457.
31. McNamara JM, Barta Z, Houston AI (2004) Variation in behaviour promotes
cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. Nature 428: 745–748.
32. Fowler JH, Johnson T, Smirnov O (2005) Human behaviour: Egalitarian motive
and altruistic punishment. Nature 433: E1.
33. Roberts G, Renwick JS (2003) The development of cooperative relationships: an
experiment. Proc Biol Sci 270: 2279–2283.
34. Nowak MA (2006) Five rules for the evolution of cooperation. Science 314:
1560–1563.
35. Axelrod R, Hamilton WD (1981) The evolution of cooperation. Science 211:
1390–1396.
36. Milinski M, Wedekind C (1998) Working memory constrains human
cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 95:
13755–13758.
37. Nowak M, Sigmund K (1993) A strategy of win-stay, lose-shift that outperforms
tit-for-tat in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. Nature 364: 56–58.
38. Aumann R (1959) Acceptable points in general cooperative n-person games. In:
Tucker A, Luce R, eds. Contribution to the Theory of Games, Vol IV, Annals
of Mathematics Studies. pp 287–324.
39. Polezzi D, Daum I, Rubaltelli E, Lotto L, Civai C, et al. (2008) Mentalizing in
economic decision-making. Behav Brain Res 190: 218–223.
40. Von Neumann J, Morgenstern O (1944) Theory of games and economic
behavior. Princeton: Princeton University Press. xviii,625 p.
41. Harsanyi JC (1982) Papers in game theory. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co.
xii,258 p.
42. Hu J, Wellman MP (1998) Multiagent Reinforcement Learning: Theoretical
Framework and an Algorithm. Proceedings of the Fifteenth International
Conference on Machine Learning: Morgan Kaufmann. pp 242–250.
43. Fudenberg D, Levine DK (1998) The theory of learning in games. Cambridge,
Mass.: MIT Press.
44. Claus C, C. B (1998) The dynamics of reinforcement learning in cooperative
multiagent systems. Proceedings of the fifteenth national conference on Artificial
intelligence. pp 746–752.
45. Littman M (1994) Markov Games as a Framework for Multi-Agent
Reinforcement Learning. Proceedings of the Eleventh International Conference
on Machine Learning. pp 157–163.
46. Stone P, Veloso M (2000) Multiagent Systems: A Survey from a Machine
Learning Perspective. Autonomous Robots 8: 345–383.
47. Criscimagna-Hemminger SE, Donchin O, Gazzaniga MS, Shadmehr R (2003)
Learned dynamics of reaching movements generalize from dominant to
nondominant arm. Journal of neurophysiology 89: 168–176.
Nash Equilibria in Motor Control
PLoS Computational Biology | www.ploscompbiol.org 8 August 2009 | Volume 5 | Issue 8 | e1000468